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Abstract 
We consider alternative methods of measuring the competitiveness of a majoritarian electoral 
system in the context of an analysis of Indian State elections. Our analysis highlights a number of 
weaknesses in the construction and interpretation of commonly used measures such as the 
effective number of parties, the first versus second place vote margin and safe seats, while 
presenting these and their proposed alternatives for 14 major Indian states from 1952 to 2009. 
The alternative indexes we present are based in part on ideas that are longstanding in the 
literature but have not been fully adopted within the Indian context. These indexes incorporate 
vote volatility, allow for multi-party competition at the constituency level, and adjust for 
asymmetry among parties of safe seats in the legislature. We argue that these newly computed 
indexes capture distinct but related dimensions of electoral competition better than do the extant 
commonly used measures. The analysis of these indexes is then extended to consider the role of 
caste, class, regionalism and level of development to reveal interesting patterns of commonality 
and difference in electoral competition across the states.  
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider how to measure the competitiveness of the electoral process in a 
majoritarian system with single member districts.1 The analysis is both methodological and 
quantitative. We identify a number of weaknesses in the construction and interpretation of some 
commonly used measures, while presenting these and our proposed alternatives for 14 major 
Indian states from 1952 to 2009. The analysis of our preferred set of indexes is then extended to 
consider the role of caste, class, regionalism and level of development to reveal interesting 
patterns of commonality and difference in electoral competition across the states. The underlying 
assumption throughout is that the competitiveness of elections matters for the well-being of 
individual citizens and for the society as a whole.2 
There are three approaches to measuring competitiveness in elections that have been relied upon 
in the literature. Each emphasizes a different dimension of competitiveness, all of which we 
regard as complements rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives. A first approach makes use 
of an analogy to private markets and focuses on the effective number of parties, where the usual 
assumption is that more parties involves a greater degree of electoral competition.3 A second 
general approach emphasizes the ex ante uncertainty of elections, with elections for which the 
outcome is 'to close to call' being more competitive.4  
These two approaches have been applied to both majoritarian and proportional electoral 
systems. A third approach combines electoral uncertainty with the winner-take-all characteristic 
of the majoritarian electoral system to focus on the relative advantage held by one of the 
contending parties, with the absence of any such advantage indicating a high degree of 
competition.5 All of these approaches face the problem of distinguishing ex ante competitiveness 
from ex post outcomes: an election can be highly competitive ex ante, but still exhibit lopsided 
results ex post. 
1 This paper forms one part of an ongoing project on the meaning, measurement and consequences of electoral 
competitiveness in Canada and India. We have Indian state data up to 2012, but 2009 is the last year of our 
complete sample for which competitiveness measures can be constructed for most of the 14 states we consider. 
The indexes presented here could also be applied to study elections for the Lok Sabha. For recent interesting 
empirical studies of Indian national elections, see Borooah (2016) who devises and studies various indexes (but 
not competitiveness) characterizing national elections in the country as a whole from 1962-2014, and the 
contributions in Palshikar et al (2014) that consider party competition (mostly state by state, and without the 
sort of indexes presented here) after the decline of Congress. 
2 A competitive contest for office under well-defined and stable rules encourages the formation and 
dissemination of information on citizen preferences, induces opposing candidates and parties to propose 
policies that better reflect the wishes of voters, and through the fear of defeat at the polls, induces incumbents 
to be responsive to minorities. See, for example, Strom (1989), Sen (1999), Besley and Burgess (2002), 
Przeworski (2010), Ashworth (2012) and Golden and Min (2013) among many others. Vigorous competition is 
also likely to reduce rents arising in governance by inducing an increase in the efficiency by which the output of 
the state is provided (e.g., Ferris et al (2008), Besley et al (2010), and Ashworth et al (2014), among others). 
3 See McDonough (1971), Banerjee and Iyer (2010), and Ashworth et al (2014) among others who use the 
number of parties, and Chhibber and Kollman (2004), Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), and Diwakar (2007) 
among others who use the effective number of parties. 
4 See, for example, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993), Rogers and Rogers (2000), Blais and Lago (2009), Grofman 
and Selb (2009) and Kayser and Lindstädt (2014). Applications to India include Banerjee and Somanathan (2007), 
Banerjee and Iyer (2010), Dash and Mukherjee (2015), Afridi et al (2016) and Mitra and Mitra (2017).   
5 See, for example, See Riker and Ordeshook (1973), Elkins (1974), Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 8), 
Johnston et al (2012), and Barkovic-Parsons et al (2017). 
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We analyze these three approaches to the measurement of competitiveness as we apply them to  
the majoritarian electoral systems of the states of India. We point to ambiguities in the 
interpretation of some widely used measures, including the effective number of parties and the 
first versus second place vote margin. The alternative indexes we propose are based in part on 
longstanding ideas in the literature, but not yet implemented for the Indian states. We argue that 
these indexes better capture the key dimensions of electoral competition identified in the general 
approaches listed above. 
 
The analysis of the general characteristics of existing and the newer indexes we consider is 
intended to apply to electoral systems generally, and especially to majoritarian ones. Of course 
the application to India poses its own special set of issues affecting the form and intensity of 
competition. Many authors point to variations in the use of clientelism as a competitive 
mechanism by which parties target potential supporters (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012, 
Anderson et al 2015, Auerbach 2016). Parties compete against a background of heterogeneous 
caste and religious allegiances (Chandra 2004, Palshikar 2006, Banerjee and Somanathan 2007, 
Roy 2012, Jaffrelot 2012). And the competitiveness of the electoral system is always under threat 
of being undermined through corruption (Aidt et al 2011, Tiwari 2014, Daxecker and Prins 2016). 
Variations in these factors are likely to arise in different degrees across the Indian states. Coping 
with this variation in the empirical work here presents challenges as well as opportunities.  
  
The analysis we conduct makes use of a panel of fourteen major Indian states comprising about 
85% of the population. Data at the state rather than national level allows for a much larger set of 
electoral observations (187 versus 15).6 This in turn permits the use of variation in a carefully 
selected set of social and economic variables against the background of which our preferred set 
of indexes can be placed. However, while each state is unique in some manner, we argue that the 
construction of overall state averages does carry significant meaning, particularly with respect to 
trends over time. In addition, the national aggregates provide a base from which the specific 
outcomes arising for different social and economic groupings can be uncovered and studied. We 
use the commonalities among groups of states, together with some of the more striking 
differences, to draw tentative conclusions about the historical evolution of electoral 
competitiveness across India’s major states. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two we focus on the difficulty of comparing market 
competition with electoral competition, and the implications of this for the interpretation of the 
effective number of parties as a measure of competition. In section three, we contrast the 
measurement of competitiveness as uncertainty using the first versus second place winning 
margin within constituencies with a more comprehensive measure based on early work by 
Przeworski and Sprague (1971). This index captures additional dimensions of elections that are 
crucial for understanding competitiveness at a constituency level, specifically the multiplicity of 
parties competing in elections, especially important in India, and the volatility of electoral support 
across elections. We then move, in section four, from considering competition among candidates 
at the constituency level to competition between parties in the state as a whole. Here we present 
a new measure, based on an old idea that in majoritarian electoral systems what matters for party 
competition is the number of marginal (or safe) seats in the legislature. To this we add adjustment 
                                                        
6 Although Assam has held elections since 1951, its division in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in variations in the 
number of electoral constituencies and instability in the party system over the first three decades. In Jammu 
and Kashmir, representatives are elected for terms of 6 years as opposed to 5 years. Moreover, due to 
insurgency related issues, elections in Jammu and Kashmir are often held amid heavy security, usually with low 
voter turnout. We have therefore omitted these states from our sample. 
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for the asymmetry in such seats among the parties contesting an election. This idea was first used 
by Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2016) to measure competitiveness in the Parliament of Canada 
over the history of the modern state. To our knowledge, no study has yet attempted to 
understand the nature of electoral competitiveness in India using these more sophisticated 
measures. 
 
In the fifth and sixth sections we consider whether using the mean value of a panel of fourteen 
major Indian states is truly representative by examining the composition of these metrics across 
two different sets of state groupings. One grouping is based on the importance of caste and 
associated class divisions in electoral politics, and the second is based on economic differences 
across states at different stages of development. In a concluding section we summarize our 
methodological arguments and selected aspects of our substantive findings for India.  
 
An Online Appendix provides correlations among the indexes we discuss; explains our treatment 
of delimitation or redistricting; presents an alternative to the effective number of parties index 
that is not included in the main text; deals at length with the classification of states by caste and 
class; and provides further details about the measurement of vote volatility.   
 
Before turning to explore the first of the three approaches to competition, it should be noted that 
in addition to competition in elections, political competition broadly defined involves the 
formation and exit of parties, competition in the legislature between elections, as well as 
competition within government and between states. Although the first of the three approaches 
outlined above allows for entry and exit, our focus is primarily on the competitiveness of the 
electoral process. 
 
2. Electoral competitiveness defined by analogy to economic competition 
 
The first approach to measuring competitiveness is built upon an analogy between electoral 
competition and competition in private markets. If individual firms in a market have no influence 
over price, firms have no market power and the industry is said to be highly or perfectly 
competitive. While this feature of private markets cannot be observed directly, the concept of 
the absence of market power can be translated into a measure of economic competitiveness 
through the logic that the more firms there are, with each supplying a smaller share of market 
demand, the ability of any individual firm to influence the market price is increasingly reduced. 
The Hirschman-Herfindahl (hereafter HH) index is designed to encapsulate this logic and is defined 
as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in an industry:  
 !!" =	∑ &'"()'*+ ,             (1) 
 
where &," is the output share of the ith firm of N in industry j. The HH index will equal one if one 
firm supplies the entire market and will approach zero as the number of firms increase and each 
firm's market share declines. 
 
The HH measure of the concentration of market power has crossed over into political science as 
the effective number of candidates or parties (ENP), defined as one over an HH index constructed 
using candidate vote shares or party vote or seat shares (Laakso and Taagepera 1979, Taagepera 
2007)7. The (unweighted) national average, vote based ENP in election t with j = 1, 2, ..., J  
                                                        
7 ENP is also referred to as Nv or Ns depending on whether vote shares or seat shares is used. 
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constituencies is: 
 
     -./0 = 	∑ (-./"0)3"*+ /	5,                           (2) 
 
where -./"0 = 1/∑ 7,"0(8,*+  is the effective number of candidates at the constituency level and 
vijt is the vote share of candidate i in constituency j in election t. Alternatively, we can employ the 
vote or seat shares of political parties at the national level to define a national party-based 
analogue to (2). In either case ENP will equal 2 if two candidates or parties equally share the vote 
and will rise as the number of candidates or parties increases and individual vote (or seat) shares 
decline. 
 
In Figure 1 we present the averages over all 14 states of the candidate, constituency level version 
of (2), along with two alternative national average ENP measures, one based on state level party 
vote shares and the other on state level party seat shares. The data here, as in the following 
figures, are calculated for each election in each state, and then linearly interpolated for 
convenience of exposition, and for time series investigations. Here and below we draw a vertical 
line at time of the Emergency (declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 25th June 1975 until 
21st March 1977), to facilitate comparison across the figures, some of which involve different 
spans of time according to our ability to compute competition indexes of different types. 
 
Figure 1: Party and Candidate ENP Measures: 14 Indian States, 1952-2009 
 
To a considerable extent the use of the HH index in political science derives from the desire to 
test the predictions made by Duverger (1954) about the effective number of candidates and 
parties that will arise in an electoral equilibrium.8 Duverger (1954) argues that in a single member 
district, plurality rule electoral system, the number of political parties at the district or 
constituency level tends towards 2 in the long run.9 In a majoritarian parliamentary system, 
                                                        
8 Cox (1997) and Taagepera (2007) provide extensive discussions of Duverger's work and references to the 
associated literature. 
9 It is widely agreed that Duverger’s Law is a statement about two-party competition within individual 
constituencies. However, the two parties at the local constituency level may differ across regions, thus leading 
2.01
2.49
2.97
3.45
3.93
4.41
19
52
19
53
19
54
19
55
19
56
19
57
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
ENP Party (seats) ENP candidate ENP Party (votes)
5 
 
factions are forced together into two parties before the election by the winner take all aspect of 
the electoral system. Cox (1997, 30) attributes the Law to elites – opinion leaders, contributors, 
party officials, etc. – who do not want to waste their influence on hopeless candidates, and to 
strategic choices made by individual voters for the same reason, with uncertainty in the process 
introduced by the problems for elites and voters of coordinating to decide who is, and who is not, 
a serious candidate. 
 
In India, studies by Chhibber and Kollman (2004), Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), Wilkinson 
(2004), Heath (2005), Chhibber and Murali (2006), Diwakar (2007, 2010), Sáez and Sinha (2010), 
Mayer (2013), and Chhibber et al (2014) use ENP to study the evolution of party system and party 
competition in India. In a variant, Goyal and Hahn (1966), McDonough (1971) and Yadav and 
Palshikar (2003) use the number of parties rather than the effective number of parties to 
distinguish between bi-party and multiparty competition.10 
 
The reasoning that links more firms or parties with less market power in a market presupposes 
that the goods competed over are private (i.e., excludable) as opposed to public or non-
excludable goods, and that cost conditions do not disadvantage multiple producers. But the good 
being competed over in a political market is the right to govern the entire electorate, the 
production of a set of policies that applies simultaneously to all voters. This characteristic of 
publicness, together with the scale economies associated with providing these public services, 
means that reasoning lying behind private market concentration ratios is not applicable. Rather, 
these characteristics imply that the right to govern in a democracy is a natural monopoly where 
the absence of competitive producers is often countered by regulation setting performance rules 
to offset the incentive the single producer has to reduce output and raise price. 
 
However, in a provocative article entitled “Why regulate utilities?”, Demsetz (1968) argued that 
the fact that there can be only one efficient producer does not preclude competition from being 
used to improve upon the welfare generated within a natural monopoly. By the splitting of two 
usually conjoined rights, the right to own industry assets and the right to determine the use of 
these assets, competition among potential managers over the dimensions of industry output and 
the prices at which output is marketed can be used to better approximate an efficient solution. In 
this way competition among potential managers over promised levels of industry output and the 
prices to be set can be used to achieve better market outcomes and reveal the insider information 
that would otherwise be needed by regulators to set the appropriate output and pricing terms. 
 
In just such a way, democratic elections encourage political parties to compete for the right to 
govern by offering to voters competing sets of policy platforms and 'management teams'. To the 
extent that competition is effective, successive elections will produce the iterative steps that 
move public policy towards the efficient equilibrium described by Demsetz. For such competition 
to enhance welfare, there must exist not only parties competing for voters through promised sets 
of alternative policies, but also parties making promises that voters view as credible. That is,  
                                                        
to more than two at the center or national level. (See for example Riker (1982), Gaines (1999), Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004) and Grofman et al (2009), in addition to Cox and Taagepera). To go from localized two-party 
competition to national competition between the same two parties requires additional assumptions. 
10 Palshikar et al (2014) study electoral competitiveness at the state level during the period 2008-2013 using a 
number of different quantitative and qualitative measures while both Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) and 
Ghosh (2010) use the index of Fragmentation (= 1-HH), due to Rae (1967), as their measure of competitiveness. 
Note that Fragmentation is a simple transformation of ENP and is highly correlated with it (at about 0.99 in our 
sample using all statewide averages). 
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promises in themselves are ineffective unless the proposing party can credibly step in and 
perform should the performance promised by the incumbent be reneged upon or not offered. 
 
In this view, contestability in the sense developed by Baumol (1982) and his co-authors – the 
ability to credibly replace the incumbent producer – is the key mechanism by which the benefits 
of competition can be realized effectively by the community. In the political arena, competition 
in an election arises through the set of policies that competing parties view as better reflecting 
the wishes of the electorate. However the public good characteristic of governance means that 
effective competition comes not from the multiplicity of policy alternatives on offer but from the 
set that can be provided by the credible alternative which must include the likelihood that 
particular policy set will be implemented. Here the instability of minor parties in single member 
plurality rule (SMP) systems highlighted by Duverger becomes critical. The incentive not to waste 
one’s vote by supporting a nonviable alternative implies that the greater is the degree of party 
fragmentation, the less effective will second or third placed parties be as a constraint on the 
performance of the governing party. Because greater fragmentation means that each of the 
smaller parties is less likely to win a majority, and since coalitions are difficult to arrange and 
maintain in SMP systems, each of these parties becomes less credible as a threat to the incumbent 
government. In such a fragmented system, the pressure on the governing party to keep election 
promises is thus diminished. Hence from the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, as we shall refer to 
it, a rise in ENP above 2 signals a decline in effective electoral competitiveness (Ferris et al 2016).11 
 
The evolution of the three ENP measures for the Indian states, shown in Figure 1 for 1952–2009, 
illustrates three general features of Indian state electoral competitiveness seen through the 
evolution of ENP. First, in common with most other parliamentary democracies and as predicted 
by Duverger, the constituency vote based measure (ENP_Candidate) always lies below the party 
vote based ENP measured at the state level (ENP_Party (votes)). The higher state-wide party 
measure reflects the fact that within a heterogeneous political jurisdiction, different parties often 
have different regional strongholds.  
 
Second, while the average ENP index in terms of state wide party votes lies above the other 
indexes, that for seats at the state level (ENP_Party (seats)) is similar to the index based on 
constituency level votes by candidate. This indicates that while on average across the states 
different parties have substantial strength in different regions of each state, that regional strength 
does not on average translate into seats in the state assemblies. In contrast, ENP by seats in the 
national parliament, the Lok Sabha, lies above ENP by votes based on aggregating up from the 
national constituency level. (See Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 168).12 Figure 1 also shows that 
despite the difference in levels for the state based measures, the movements of ENP_Party (seats) 
and ENP_Party (votes) are similar; their correlation is about 0.8.  
Third, with the exception of the initial rise (fall) in the seat based (vote based) ENP series, through  
the early 1960’s, all three ENP measures can be seen to gradually increase from about the time  
                                                        
11 There is an additional source of inefficiency stemming from the possibility that as the number of parties 
increases, each party is forced to focus its electoral promises on ever narrower segments of the electorate, thus 
moving the public sector towards special interests and away from the provision of public services. See Bueno de 
Mesquita et al (2001) and Lizzeri and Persico (2005) for interesting explorations of this view and Chhibber and 
Nooruddin (2004) and Winer et al (2018) for a similar hypothesis concerning the Indian states.   
12 In Canada, as for India, the analogue to Figure 1 for national elections shows that ENP by party seats in 
Parliament lies substantially above ENP calculated using votes at the national constituency level, because in 
Canada, regionally based parties win seats in different parts of the country (See Ferris et al (2016) for the graph 
corresponding to Figure 1). 
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of the emergency in the late-1970s onward. This likely reflects the gradual erosion of support for  
the Indian National Congress (INC) Party that had dominated elections both at the center and in 
the states over the first two decades following Independence. During that early period political 
competition was primarily internal, within different factions of the Congress Party. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, state-specific parties were formed based on regional issues. These parties 
gradually gained prominence and successfully challenged the Congress Party’s dominance, 
particularly at the state level, so that in the late 1980s, all variants of ENP began to trend upwards. 
Interpreting this pattern from a Duverger-Demsetz perspective suggests an early period of 
consolidation of candidates about parties in the first few decades, followed by a few decades of 
stable contestation and then a slowly growing fragmentation of the vote that reduced the 
credibility of parties attempting to compete with the incumbent. In this interpretation then, 
competition as contestability has been slowly declining in Indian state elections since the late 
1980s. 
 
Before accepting such a conclusion, however, we note that a problem arises with using ENP 
defined by vote shares as a basis for testing Duverger's Law.  That is, while ENP is equal to 2 when 
two parties have equal shares, a value of 2 can also originate with share distributions such as 
(0.666, 0.167, 0.167) where one party is dominant. Conversely, an ENP above 2 can represent a 
state with a more equal division of votes between two major parties, as with shares (0.40, 0.40, 
0.20) for which ENP = 2.78.13  The latter example appears to represent a more competitive and 
contestable system than does the former where one party dominates with a two-thirds share.  
 
Such examples have led to the development of other indexes on which to base a test of Duverger's 
Law, which we may now think of as the proposition that contestability will increase over time as 
the number of parties converges on 2 from above. Two of these have been proposed by Gaines 
and Taagepera (2013).14 The first index, T-partyness, is designed to incorporate information on 
the votes received by all parties other than the top two. This is an attempt to avoid the problem 
that ENP = 2 can result from vote patterns that otherwise suggest one party dominance, and other  
patterns that exaggerate departures from 2 when two party dominance is likely (Gaines and 
Taagepera 2013, 2). The T-partyness index is defined as  
 
 9:;<=>?@&&"0 = (7("0 − 7B"0)(7+"0 + 7("0)/7+"0.                  (3) 
 
where 7B"0  refers to all other parties. It h as a maximum of 1 when exactly 2 parties have equal 
vote shares and decreases as the share captured by other parties rises.  
 
Gaines and Taagepera also propose a second measure of the deviation from 2; the Euclidean 
distance of vote shares from an equal share for two parties, (1/2, 1/2, 0),  in the case of three 
parties. The index is again normalized to lie between 1 and 0.  (When one party has all the votes, 
D2 = 0).  More generally with J parties, 
 
 E2"0 = 1 − √2	H(3,  
  
where  H(3 = J(0.5 − 7+)( + (0.5 − 7()( + (0 − 7B)( … .+(0 − 73)(	.   (4) 
 
                                                        
13 These examples are supplied by Rein Taagepera (personal communication). 
14 A third alternative to ENP, the Closeness index of Endersby et al (2002), is presented in the Appendix. It turns 
out to be highly correlated with the D2 index of Gaines and Taagepera. 
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In Figure 1a below we present the time paths of these two alternative measures, built up from 
the constituency level to the state level, and then averaged over our fourteen states for each 
election, where J = 6 for the D2 measure. ENP (using candidate vote shares) is also included here 
for comparison purposes. As can be seen from that figure, the two measures differ in level. But 
neither exhibits a significant time trend nor, except for the very early period, do they exhibit a 
different pattern of change over time. When compared to ENP, however, we see a challenge to 
the interpretation that competitiveness has declined in Indian state elections in the post-1980 
time period. Unlike ENP which has trended upwards after 1985, T-partyness and D2 both vary 
without trend from about 1960 onwards.  
 
Figure 1a: T-partyness, D2, and ENP_candidate, 1952-2009 
 
One should note that it is likely that Indian states had low T-Partyness before 1977 due to the 
dominance of Congress, and then about the same values after 1990 due to the entrenchment of 
multi-partyness following the decline of Congress. Whether contestability was equal in these 
situations is not clear however. Moreover, we note that none of the indexes in Figure 1a is 
designed to measure the credibility of the opposition as a government in waiting. Thus it seems 
wise to remain agnostic about the evolution of contestability across the Indian states, a clearly 
superior index of which, in our view, remains to be constructed. 
 
3.  Electoral competitiveness as ex ante uncertainty 
 
A second approach to electoral competitiveness focuses on the ex ante uncertainty or 
unpredictability of election outcomes. An appeal to the uncertainty of an election focuses on a 
different dimension to competitiveness than does contestability. From the contestability 
perspective, an election is competitive if the incumbent can be replaced credibly by an equivalent 
or superior alternative. However, a contestable election need not also be highly uncertain. While 
contestability constrains the options of the incumbent, replacement will arise only when the 
incumbent behaves 'badly' or miscalculates the nature of voter preferences. If a candidate or 
party is superior in terms of performance, we may observe long periods of one-party dominance  
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even in a highly competitive system, a point also made by Buchler (2010).15 
 
In the limit, in this second approach, a perfectly competitive election would be unpredictable in 
the sense that the ex ante distribution of possible outcomes would not be biased in favor of the 
incumbent. A strong version of this view, as a hypothesis, might be formulated as: ex ante there 
is no available information that can be used to predict the outcome of the upcoming election. In 
this form, the statement is analogous to the efficient markets hypothesis.16 
 
Whether or not we can link economic and political understandings of uncertainty in this way, the 
idea that a competitive election is ‘too close to call’ has a long tradition in both the political science 
literature and popular discourse. (For recent contributions, see, Blais and Lago (2009), and 
Grofman and Selb (2009)). It is important to recognize that the logic tying together closeness, 
uncertainty and competitiveness is ex ante: the expectation must be formed prior to the 
revelation of election outcomes. This generates a problem for interpretation when realized 
outcomes are used. If, in operationalizing 'too close to call', we simply replace the ex ante concept 
with its ex post election outcome (plus a random term), we are implicitly invoking rational 
expectations and hence adopting the strongest version of the hypothesis stated above. No matter 
what information is used, however, all attempts at measurement must deal with this important 
ex ante - ex post distinction. 
 
In India, as in other democratic states, many studies have used the observed first versus second 
place vote margin to measure electoral competitiveness. Here an election is seen as highly 
competitive if the actual first versus second place vote share margin, 7+ − 7(, is 'small', where 7, 
is the vote share of candidate or party i. For example, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2000), Wilkinson 
(2004), Arulampalam et al. (2009), Crost and Kambhampati (2010), Banerjee and Iyer (2010), Sáez 
and Sinha (2010), Jha (2014), Dash and Mukherjee (2015), Afridi et al (2016), and Mitra and Mitra 
(2017) all use the winning margin in their work.17 
 
In Figure 2, the dotted line graphs the average first versus second place winning margin (denoted 
Win_Margin) across the constituencies of the fourteen Indian states. This is done from 1962 
instead of 1952 as in Figure 1 because of the need to deal with delimitation or redistricting, as 
explained below and in more detail in section A2 of the Appendix. If we interpret the size of the 
winning vote margin (scaled on the right-hand axis) as a measure of how close the election 
outcome was, and thus an inverse measure of the degree of competitiveness, the time pattern 
exhibited suggests that electoral competition has gradually risen over time. Viewed more closely, 
the first versus second winning margin remained fairly constant through the mid-1980s, at about 
17 percent, before beginning a period of continuous decline. Between 1984 and 2008 the winning 
margin fell about 40 percent (from 17 to about 11 percent) seemingly signaling a rise in electoral 
competitiveness within India’s state constituencies.18  
 
                                                        
15 The inverse, however, need not hold. One-party dominance by itself is not a good indicator of the degree of 
competition and this of course makes an assessment of the relationship between the duration of incumbency 
and the competitiveness of the electoral system a complex matter. 
16 A weaker version of this hypothesis requires only that past election outcomes cannot be used to predict 
current ones. 
17 The study by Besley and Burgess (2002) uses a variant of the winning margin, the difference in seat shares of 
the Congress Party and its main competitor(s). 
18 One may note that the simple constituency first versus second place winning margin is highly negatively 
correlated with ENP_Candidate, at -0.84. 
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Figure 2: Winning Margin, Volatility and the Volatility Adjusted Winning Margin, 1962-2009 
 
One reason for caution in relying upon the evidence in Figure 2 is that a close outcome or a small 
expected winning margin can be quite safe for an incumbent if that party's vote in the 
constituency varies little across elections, while even a large margin may be effectively small if a 
large number of voters typically switch their vote from election to election. This point has been 
recognized for some time. (See, for example, Przeworski and Sprague (1971), Elkins (1974), and 
Bartolini and Mair (1990)). To more accurately reflect the relevant margin facing candidates in 
each constituency, vote margins must be adjusted for vote volatility.19 It turns out empirically that 
this adjustment is crucial. 
 
Adjusting the vote margins for volatility is not easy to do over long periods of time because of 
redistricting. To deal with this issue, we link administrative districts with electoral constituencies 
and use party averages across the district in which a new constituency lies to construct a proxy 
for the past history of the new constituency.20 
 
The volatility measure at time t for each constituency is defined following Przeworski and Sprague 
(1971) by 
 
 NOP;=QPQ=>"0 = ∑ RSTUVWSTUVWXRYTZX ( 	,										∀	\ = 1….,         (5) 
 
where 7]"0	is the vote share of party p in constituency j in election t.21 Our constituency level 
measure uses the sum over the top six party candidates plus an Other, residual category, where 
a (major) party is defined as one appearing in the top ten vote receiving state parties in three 
successive elections, or as those receiving more than 8 percent of the vote in at least one election. 
                                                        
19 Volatility by social and by income grouping of states, introduced later on, is presented in Appendix A4. 
20 Appendix A1 describes how administrative districts are used to link constituencies across time, along with 
further details on the construction of volatility. 
21 See also Pedersen (1979). Volatility is constructed by using vote shares on a party basis.  
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(Others are put into the residual category). Note that the volatility index will incorporate changes 
in both the size of the franchise and voter turnout. 
 
The average constituency level vote volatility across 14 states is plotted against the left-hand 
margin of Figure 2 above from 1962 instead of 1952 because of the difficulties of dealing with 
redistricting. As can be seen from that diagram, Volatility exhibits a different time pattern than 
does the unadjusted vote margin Win_Margin, first rising and then falling from the late 1970s 
onwards, with an overall correlation with the Win_Margin for 1962–2009 of just -0.04.22 
 
Volatility adjusted, first versus second place vote margins are constructed at the constituency 
level by dividing the first versus second place winning margin by the constituency’s volatility, and 
then aggregating using the constituency’s share of the aggregate state vote. Formally, a state’s 
weighted average volatility adjusted winning margin is defined as 
 
 NOP;=QPQ=>	^H\_&=@H	`Q??Q?a	b;<aQ?0 = ∑ 	(SXUVcSdUV)		Sefg0,f,0hV 		∙ ;H\_7k"0	3"*+ ,	   (6)  
 
where 		;H\SlUV = 	7O=@&	Q?	mO?&=Q=_@?m>	\	;=	=	 	;aa<@a;=@	&=;=@	7O=@&	;=	=	⁄ .										 
 
The average across states of the state level volatility adjusted winning vote margin, labeled 
Vol_adj_margin is shown relative to the left-hand axis in Figure 2. Here a larger number 
represents less competition. What is immediately apparent is that the volatility adjusted measure 
exhibits a dramatically different time pattern than does the unadjusted winning margin. The 
correlation between them is just 0.29. Also, while ENP_Candidate and the unadjusted winning 
margin are negatively correlated at -0.84, the volatility adjusted winning margin is more or less 
uncorrelated with any of the ENP measures over the 1962 to 2009 period. 
 
Instead of suggesting a continuous improvement in competitiveness as does the unadjusted  
margin, the volatility adjusted measure implies a period of rising competitiveness at the beginning 
of our period in 1962 through 1978, followed by a dramatic decrease in competitiveness 
throughout the early 1980s, before rising back to an intermediate and stable level from the early 
1990s onwards.  
 
3.1. More inclusive competition measures using multi-party vote margins 
 
A weakness of the volatility adjusted winning margin, and hence with any story based on it, is that 
this index reflects competition arising only in relation to the first versus the second place 
candidate, a consideration that is problematic in a multi-party system like India, where third and 
fourth place candidates can make life difficult for the incumbent, and where smaller parties 
sometimes join in a coalition government.23 Following Przeworski and Sprague (1971), we have 
therefore developed a multi-party volatility adjusted margins measure of competitiveness, based  
                                                        
22 We recall that correlations are found in Table A1. Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008) use aggregate vote shares 
at the state level and note a similar decline in volatility from the late 1970’s onward. Appendix section A5 shows 
the pattern of volatility when states are grouped according to caste and class, and when grouped according to 
level of development. The patterns there are both about the same as for Volatility in Figure 2 - that is, humped 
shaped with a peak around the time of the emergency  or a few years after. 
23 Generally speaking, the vote share of 3rd and 4th place candidates started increasing in the 1970s and 80s after 
state-specific regional parties became more prominent. The role of 3rd and 4th place candidates varies across 
states. For example, in UP and Bihar, where parties formed in the 1980s based on caste, the number of effective 
parties increased and 3rd and 4th place candidates’ vote shares in these two states subsequently grew to become 
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on the view that every (nonincumbent) candidate's objective is overcoming their vote deficit vis-
a-vis the previous winner. 
 
This vote deficit is expressed as ℎ]"0 = (7+"0c+ − 7]"0c+) for all parties or candidates, p, in 
constituency, j, other than the incumbent, whose ℎ+"0 = 0	and who is excluded. As with the simple 
winning margin, the distance to be overcome becomes more meaningful when the vote deficit ℎ]"0  is adjusted for volatility, 
 
     ℎ]"0 = (SXUVWXcSTUVWX)pefg0,f,0hTVWX ,              (7) 
 
where volatility is the same measure as that used in (3) above. Using (7), a competitiveness index 
for a party or candidate is then defined as follows: 
 
     m]"0 = q1	Qr	0 ≤ ℎ]"0 ≤ 1+tUV 		Qr	ℎ]"0 > 1  .               (8) 
 
When c = 1 the vote deficit or 'distance to go' faced by that party or candidate is smaller than the 
portion of the electorate that switched parties last time. Hence the candidate challenging the 
leader in the last election is a fully credible rival. Otherwise the index is less than one and falls as 
the margin to overcome grows relative to volatility.  
 
Aggregating across all the candidates (except the one in first place who is omitted) within each 
constituency j, using as weights the vote share that each candidate in a constituency receives, 
yields a multi-candidate, constituency level measure of competitiveness: 
 v"0 = ∑ m]"0 	7]"0	.w]*+                              (9) 
 
A Cj = 0 indicates no competition among the challengers in that constituency (and is used to 
represent any constituencies in which the election was uncontested). Perfect competition is a 
situation where all parties face a distance to go to overcome the vote share of the leader that is 
less than historical volatility, in which case Cj = 1. Aggregating across all constituencies, using the 
constituency’s share of the aggregate state vote, then yields the candidate based multi-party 
volatility adjusted margins index for each state vx30 : 
 vx0 = 	∑ v"0	3"*+ ;H\_7k"0,                                              (10) 
 
where	;H\_7k"0  is defined as in (6). We shall refer to this multi-party, volatility adjusted measure 
of competitiveness at the constituency level as the MV_Margins_Candidate index. In a similar 
manner we can construct an alternative party version of (10) by first aggregating the party c's in 
(8) across all constituencies for the same party, and then aggregating at the state level across 
parties using as weights the vote shares of the state parties. We shall refer to this variant as the 
MV_Margins_Party index. 
 
                                                        
relatively large compared to other states. We also note that in our sample as a whole, there are only a few 
coalition governments before 1990, but from 1990 onwards about 50% of state governments are coalitions. 
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It is important to note that as described above, both of these measures use data from the prior 
election and hence are historical or predetermined measures. MV_Margins measures using 
current election outcomes can also be used to construct adaptive multi-party competition indexes 
by constituency and by party, which are weighted averages of historical and current values, and 
which are highly correlated (at above 0.96) with the historical values. (Both types of measures will 
be available in the accompanying Online Data). 
 
The national averages of the two versions of the state level historical MV_Margins indexes are 
presented in Figure 3. There it can be seen that these multi-party competition indexes exhibit a 
similar pattern of movement over time – the correlation between them is 0.94 – but are different 
in terms of their levels; the party based measure is roughly double the size of the candidate 
measure. 
 
Figure 3: MV_Margins Measures of Candidate and Party Competitiveness, 1967-2009 
 
When compared to the time path of the simpler volatility adjusted winning margin in Figure 2 
where, to recall, a bigger index number represents less competitiveness, we see that the multi-
party volatility adjusted indexes are quite different. The overall correlation between these two 
sets of indexes is positive: 0.43 for MV_Margins_Candidate with the simpler (first versus second) 
Vol_adj_margin in Figure 2, and 0.58 for MV_Margins_Party. Thus when the simple volatility 
adjusted margin indicates (by its decline in value) that an increase in competitiveness has 
occurred, the multi-party volatility adjusted indexes defined in (10) tend to indicate the opposite. 
Clearly the multi-party context of Indian state elections matters. 
 
In Figures 2 and 3, we see that elections just after the emergency were highly (Figure 2) or more 
competitive (Figure 3) than in 1977. But the simple adjusted margin in Figure 2 shows that 
elections were becoming more competitive before and up to the emergency, while the more 
complex indexes in Figure 3 indicate the opposite. Over the decade of the 1980s, the patterns are 
also quite different: in the first of these figures using the simple volatility adjusted win margin, we 
see declining competitiveness up to the mid-1980s, and rising competition for the rest of that 
decade, while in Figure 3 using the multi-party volatility adjusted index MV_Margins, the pattern 
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is opposite in nature. After 1990 both of these indexes exhibit a similar absence of trend, though 
fluctuations in the indexes are also to some degree opposite in nature. Electoral competition on 
a volatility adjusted vote margin basis evidently looks quite different depending upon whether 
third and lower placed competitors are included. 
 
It is also interesting to compare the MV_Margins measures with the assessment of 
competitiveness that arises from the Duverger-Demsetz interpretation of ENP shown in Figure 1. 
For example, while the Duverger-Demsetz interpretation suggests competitiveness as 
contestability of a credible alternative is trending downwards from about 1985 to 1995 when ENP 
is rising, the MV_Margins indexes indicate that competitiveness falls from about 1985 until 1990 
and then rises until the mid-1990s. 
 
4. Electoral unpredictability and risk in the competition among parties for power  
 
Although the volatility adjusted multi-party vote margins tell us something about the 
unpredictability of the representative electoral contest at the constituency level, they do not 
explicitly incorporate an adjustment for the riskiness of an election outcome for a party at the 
state level. The third type of competitiveness index we propose does so.  
 
As is well known, a good election strategy in a single member district parliamentary system is to 
target marginal constituencies – districts especially susceptible to changing hands in an election.24 
This suggests that the proportion of marginal constituencies would be a useful measure of the 
degree of competitiveness in the electoral contest of that state. If every constituency is perfectly 
safe for its incumbent, there is no competition. And if every seat is marginal, every seat is a 
battleground, as Bodet (2014) puts it. We could then say that an election with a high proportion 
of marginal seats is highly contestable (at the state level) in the sense of Demsetz and Baumol, 
and use the proportion of marginal seats as a competitiveness index. However, because the party 
with relatively more of the safe seats will have an important electoral advantage, at least in its 
ability to target resources towards competitive constituencies relative to its competitors, we 
should incorporate an adjustment to the number of marginal seats to allow for asymmetry that 
may arise across parties in the distribution of such contested constituencies. 
 
To operationalize the idea that electoral competitiveness depends on the proportion of 
asymmetry adjusted marginal seats or marginal constituencies, we must define what marginal 
means. Hartle (1985) suggests that a marginal constituency is one from which economic rents 
cannot be taken and redistributed to other constituencies without serious risk of electoral defeat. 
This is an attractive definition, but one that is impossible to apply without being able to measure 
the distribution of rents across constituencies. Previous empirical work on safe seats includes 
Lovinck (1973) and more recently Bodet (2014), both of whom study Canada’s electoral history. 
Bodet’s definition of a safe seat is one that lies in the upper tail of the distribution of vote margins. 
He uses a one standard deviation above the mean standard to judge safeness, based on the 
distribution of vote margins that arose in the previous election (along with other ancillary criteria). 
Any constituency with a winning margin above this level is considered to have a vote cushion 
sufficiently large to provide ‘safeness’ to the incumbent. 
 
Let the historical volatility adjusted winning margin for incumbent party p (which won at time  
                                                        
24 See Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 8), Moon (2006), and Barkovic-Parsons et al (2017) for recent 
exposition and tests. 
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t-1) in constituency j in election t in a given state be defined as 
 
      y/z;<aQ?]"0 = (SXTUVWXc	SdUVWX)pefg0,f,0hVWX  .                            (11) 
 
Here we are defining incumbency by party, not by name of candidate, as with volatility. (At issue 
is party competition.) Forming a distribution of constituencies by the size of their IPmargins across 
a rolling average of three past consecutive elections, and applying a one standard deviation cutoff 
rule leads to the number and hence proportion of seats considered safe in each election, {0. We 
then compute the proportion of marginal seats in each election, MSt, 
 							b|0 = 	1 −	{0,	                            (12) 
 
as a measure of the competitiveness of the election as a whole. MS = 1 indicates that all of the 
seats in the state assembly are marginal and hence that the electoral system is highly competitive 
in this sense. 
 
While a smaller overall proportion of safe seats implies that more seats are up for grabs, how safe 
seats are distributed among competing parties also matters, as noted earlier. Adjusting the 
proportion of marginal seats MSt by the degree of asymmetry among parties in their holding of 
safe seats produces a new measure of electoral competitiveness at the state level. To do so, we 
use the idea behind the D2 measure of Gaines and Taagepera (2013) referred to earlier. This 
involves measuring the Euclidean deviation from a three-party equal sharing of safe seats,	}30, 
to reflect the degree to which the distribution of safe seats departs from the case where safe 
seats are equally distributed, where the third party is a residual consisting of the parties other 
than the top two:  
 }30 = 		J3/2		 ∗ J(1/3 − |+0)(	 + (1/3 − |(0)(	 + (1/3− |B0)(	,                      (13) 
 
Here Spkt = the seat share in the state legislature of the party in kth place in terms of seats. If the 
safe seats are symmetrically distributed, }30= 0, and if one party has all safe seats, }30 = 1. In 
this calculation as we carry it out, the third 'party' will refer to all parties other than the dominant 
two. However if the third party vote is substantial and it is desirable to ignore smaller parties, 
party vote shares could be renormalized among the top three competing parties so that the party 
vote shares sum to 1. 
 
The computation of the asymmetry adjusted index of marginal seats begins by first adjusting the 
proportion of safe seats for the asymmetry in their distribution:   
 
 ^|0 = {0}30,              (14) 
 
so that ^|0 = 0 if safe seats symmetrically distributed, and ^|0 = {0  (the proportion of safe 
seats) if one party has all the safe seats. We then use 	^|0  to define the asymmetry adjusted index 
of marginal seats as 
 
 	^b|0 	= 1 −	{{0}30}.                     (15) 
 
Hence	^b|Ç0 	= 1 if all safe seats are symmetrically distributed, and 	^b|0 	= 1 − {0  (the  
proportion of marginal seats) if one party has all the safe seats.  
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Since, by construction, ^ b| will always lie above b|	on a graph as long as there is any asymmetry  
in safe seats, additional insight comes from looking at changes in the two measures as signals of 
whether or not there has been a change in electoral competitiveness and for what reason. Hence 
in Figure 4 below we present the first differences of these two measures and note that through 
their co-movement they tell a similar story for the evolution of party competitiveness at the state 
level. However the less dramatic swings in AMS relative to MS also indicate that changes in the 
asymmetry of safe seats has worked to moderate the degree of change that would otherwise be 
indicated by proportion of marginal seats. In the case of Indian states, changes in the proportion 
of marginal seats will overstate the variation in electoral competitiveness at the state level by 
ignoring the moderating effects that offsetting changes in asymmetry in the distribution of safe 
seats have had on electoral competition.  
 
Figure 4: Change in Competitiveness as Signaled by Changes in MS and AMS, 1972-2009
 
 
With the adjustment for asymmetry across safe seats, the changes in AMS suggest that the overall 
trend throughout the 1970s was one of state elections gradually becoming less competitive, with 
a notable exception for the period after the emergency when asymmetry adjusted marginal seats 
rose. This trend reversed dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s when competitiveness 
(according to the AMS measure) increased substantially. It then dipped downwards until about 
2000, after which time in varied with little trend. 
 
What is also of interest is that for the 1980s, a comparison of our measures of competitiveness at 
the constituency level – the volatility adjusted winning margins MV_Margins_Candidate and 
MV_Margins_Party in Figure 3 – show a dramatic increase in constituency competitiveness at the 
same time as competitiveness across the major state parties as shown by MS and AMS was just 
as rapidly falling. The early 1990s exhibit a similar reversal in competitive predictions as do 
subsequent sub-periods. Taken together these comparisons suggest that competition among 
candidates and parties at the constituency level is quite different from competition among the 
major parties at the state level. Even more strongly, the results suggest that the two may be 
inversely related, with more intense competition at the constituency level undermining the 
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competitiveness of elections viewed as a contest between parties at the higher level. This is a 
tentative hypothesis that may deserve further investigation. 
 
5. Electoral competitiveness and social and ethnic differences across Indian States  
 
In an ethnically heterogeneous country like India, social identities play an important role in all 
aspects of the electoral system, with the major ethnic divisions being caste, social class, language 
and religion. All such group identities have been used by political parties in their attempts to win 
support. Of these, caste-based identity is probably the single most important factor in the 
formation of bonds between voters and parties. The oft-used phrase ‘Indians vote their caste 
while casting their vote’ reflects the centrality of caste in Indian politics.25 
 
This section of the paper focuses on how competitiveness varies with caste and class. We rely on 
the classification in Church (1984) and Harriss (1999, Table 2, 3371), with adjustments for political 
developments since these papers were written. We divide our set of 14 states into four broad 
groupings, which are: 26 
 
Group 1: states where caste forms the organizational basis for political parties (Bihar 
 and Uttar Pradesh). 
Group 2:  states in which class and regional concerns form the basis for party structure 
 (Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal). 
Group 3:  states where the middle castes or classes and commercial interests dominate 
 party structure (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, 
 and Punjab). 
Group 4: states where upper caste or class dominance persists (Madhya Pradesh, 
 Odisha, and Rajasthan). 
 
The reasoning behind the classification is discussed at length in section A4 of the Appendix. We 
consider the comparative evolution of competitiveness across these groups using a menu of 
indexes of competitiveness. Figures 5 through 8 present the ENP_Candidate index, the Volatility 
adjusted, first versus second place winning margin, the multi-party volatility adjusted index 
MV_Margins_Candidate, and the asymmetry adjusted marginal seats index AMS, each for the 
four separate state groupings outlined above. 
                                                        
25 See, for example, Jaffrelot’s (2012) chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics for just such an 
observation on caste alliances with political parties in India. 
26 Church (1984) develops a fourfold caste and class hierarchy to study caste and class centric politics in 7 major 
Indian states (Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal).26 Harriss (1999) 
extends this framework to include 6 more major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu). The fourfold class-based caste hierarchy includes the ‘upper’ castes, 
‘middle’ castes, ‘lower’ castes, and ‘scheduled’ castes. Upper castes consist of such sub castes as brahmans, 
kshatriyas and banias. These castes have long dominated society and politics as landlords in rural India and as 
businessman and influential professionals in urban India. Middle castes constitute the major farming castes such 
as jats, yadavas, kurmins, marathas, and so on. The majority of India’s population belong to this caste group, 
and in caste hierarchy, middle castes enjoy special status below the upper castes. Middle castes dominate 
politics at the local level as they control land and labor. At the bottom of the social status hierarchy are the 
scheduled castes. Scheduled castes are ex-untouchables working primarily as agricultural laborers. Lower castes 
fit between middle and scheduled castes in the caste hierarchy. They are better understood in terms of their 
professions: marginal farmers, sharecroppers, barbers, boatmen, blacksmiths, carpenters, oil-pressers and so 
on. The lower and scheduled castes were the last stratums of society to be brought into politics. 
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[Figures 5 - 8 here] 
 
Figure 5: ENP_Candidate Measures by Social Groupings, 1952-2009 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Volatility Adjusted (1 vs. 2) Winning Margin by Social Groupings, 1962-2009 
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Figure 7: MV_Margins_Candidate Measures by Social Groupings, 1967-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Asymmetry Adjusted Marginal Seats by Social Groupings, 1971-2009 
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5.1 Observed differences in electoral competition across the four caste and class groupings 
 
We immediately see when looking at these figures collectively that while the separate group 
measures often differ widely in their levels and sometimes produce particular group-specific 
timing responses, all four groupings exhibit a similar pattern of movement across time.27 For 
example, if we look at the evolution of the four ENP_Candidate groupings in Figure 5 and treat 
the elections arising during the emergency in 1977 as an outlier, then the four groupings move 
more or less in parallel with Group 1 at the top, Group 2 at the bottom and Groups 3 and 4 varying 
in between. Similarly, in Figure 6 the height ordering of the group positions on the diagram is 
reversed but the time series follow a common pattern through time. Figure 7 is more problematic, 
but allowing for sometimes dramatic differences in scale, Figure 8 reproduces a common pattern 
of movement through time. On the whole, then, disaggregation by caste and class based 
groupings suggests that the movement of the state averages may well be representative of 
common changes arising across the states lying beneath the social and economic differences with 
which they have been classified. 
 
A formal test for whether the groupings do exhibit a common linkage through time must consider 
whether the groups are cointegrated within each category. Table 1 reports the Adjusted Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) statistics resulting from a unit root test for each of the four group time series reported 
in Figures 5 through 8. They indicate that typically three of the four series for each of the 
competitive measures are nonstationary or I(1), while the remaining series is stationary. It follows 
that the data for the four caste/class groupings are consistent with the presence of a common 
stochastic trend or long run equilibrium relationship) within each index type if the residuals of a 
linear regression involving the four separate time series are found to be stationary. 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests for each Index across the four Socio-Ethnic Groupings 
 
Tests for the presence of a cointegrating relationship across groups for each of the four indexes 
are shown in Table 2. The regressions reported are fully modified ordinary least squares (FMLS) 
equations that adjust for serial correlation arising among the covariates and for the presence of 
both I(0) and I(1) variables in each equation.28  The results of the unit root test on the regression 
residuals are reported at the extreme right end of each equation. Together with exhibiting very 
high adjusted R2 values, the reported ADF statistics imply that the residuals for three of our four 
competitive measures are stationary. For the fourth, marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry, 
there is a strong suggestion of coordinated movement through time: -3.22 is significant at 10%.   
                                                        
27 Because some state governments do not last their full term, state elections are not coordinated over time. 
This has a small effect on the timing of peaks and troughs in the individual series. 
28 Note that the inclusion of a stationary variable in the cointegrating equation implies that the stationary 
variable integrates with the stationary combination of I(1) variables. 
1% (5%) Critical Values = -3.57 (-2.92) Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 
4 
ENP_Candidate                                             Level  
                                                                   First Difference 
-2.86 
-5.09 
-3.86 -2.26 
-4.23 
-1.99 
-3.28 
Volatility adjusted winning margin         Level  
                                                                  First Difference 
-4.03 -3.17 
-5.59 
-2.81 
-3.55 
-4.44 
Multiparty volatility                                    Level                 
adjusted winning margins                   First Difference    
-2.50 
-3.82 
-4.06 -2.45 
-6.64 
-2.31 
-6.62 
Asymmetrically adjusted                             Level 
marginal constituencies                       First Difference 
-1.82 
-7.08 
-1.78 
-6.70 
-1.88 
-7.76 
-1.78 
-6.40 
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Table 2: Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
ENP (1960 – 2009); VOL (1962-2009); MV_Margins (1960-2009); AMS (1960-2009) 
 Note: McKinnon 5% critical value for the residuals of three additional variables = -3.34 
 
Thus the visual indication in Figures 5 through 8 that there are common trends across the groups 
for each index is not deceptive. Despite the major differences in the social composition of Indian 
states, each of the four measures of electoral competition exhibit a common stochastic trend. 
The determinants of these common trends remain to be identified. 
 
While the cointegration observed is striking, so is the difference in levels across groups for each 
index of competitiveness. We have space to consider only one of these differences here, for 
Group 1 states Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In Figure 8, Group 1 has a smaller proportion of 
asymmetry adjusted marginal seats consistently appearing at the bottom of the diagram, while 
the other three groups all have a much higher and similar proportion of contestable seats. Figures 
6 and 7 together suggest that the first versus second winning margin in Group 1 is low in part 
because the percentage of the vote held by second and third place parties is relatively high. The 
multiplicity of similar sized parties in combination with a relatively high degree of seat safeness 
across constituencies reinforces the fragmentation character of Group 1 states shown in Figure 5. 
Thus we see that the fragmentation of the vote in combination with the larger proportion of safe 
seats makes the elections in Group 1 less contestable and less competitive overall despite their 
relatively narrow, first versus second place winning margins. Other groups may be analyzed in 
analogous fashion.   
  
6.  Stages of development and electoral competition: BIMAROU versus the others 
 
Finally, we compare the evolution of our measures when the states are divided into groups based 
on their stage of development. To do so we distinguish between the five BIMAROU or sick states 
- Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh - and the other nine more 
developed ones. The BIMAROU states have lagged behind the others in terms of per capita real 
GDP, access to tap water, electricity, toilets, and so on.29 The four competitive measures when 
disaggregated into these two groups are shown in Figures 9 through 12, and analyzed below. 
 
[Figures 9 - 12 here] 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 See Ghosh (2016) and Mishra and Mishra (2018) for recent examples of studies grouping states on this basis. 
 Constant Group2_i Group3_i Group4_i Statistics 
ENP_Candidate Group1 
where i = ENP_Candidate 
2.71*** 
(4.53) 
-0.605*** 
(3.47) 
0.427*** 
(2.66) 
0.405*** 
(3.13) 
AdjR2 = 0.678 
ADF (resid) = -3.55 
VOL_Group1 where i = 
Volatility adjusted winning 
margin 
0.218*** 
(4.92) 
0.024 
(0.733) 
0.394*** 
(3.20) 
-0.138 
(1.12) 
AdjR2 = 0.538 
ADF(resid) = -5.12 
MV_Margins_Group1 
where i =Multiparty volatility 
adjusted winning margins 
0.002 
(0.196) 
0.434 
(1.58) 
0.856*** 
(4.03) 
-0.068 
(0.261) 
AdjR2 = 0.976 
ADF(resid) = -3.79 
AMS_sd Group1 where i = 
Asymmetrically adjusted 
marginal constituencies 
0.0005 
(0.080) 
0.169 
(1.60) 
0.044 
(0.510) 
0.692*** 
(5.06) 
AdjR2 = 0.996 
ADF(resid) = -3.22 
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Figure 9: ENP_Candidate by Economic Grouping, 1952-2009 
Note: BIMAROU states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
Figure 10: Volatility Adjusted (1 vs. 2) Winning Margin by Economic Grouping, 1962-2009 
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Figure 11: MV_Margins_Candidate by Economic Grouping, 1967-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Marginal Seats Adjusted for Asymmetry by Economic Grouping, 1971-2009 
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It can be seen in these figures that while the heights of the two lines associated with each grouping 
are different in each case, their pattern of movement is once again broadly similar across time. In 
fact the sets of correlations between the two economic groupings are higher than they were for 
the four groupings shown in Figures 5 through 8: - 0.5 for the two ENP_Candidate measures, 0.83 
for the two volatility adjusted margins, 0.62 for MV_Margins_Candidate, and 0.72 for the two 
AMS measures.30  It follows that while the level of electoral competition indicated by our metrics 
is dramatically different across the two groups, their co-movement through time suggests that 
they share common influences that are not related to the reasons for regional heterogeneity in 
Indian development. 
 
If we treat the emergency as anomalous, then a Duverger-Demsetz interpretation of the two 
ENP_Candidate measures in Figure 9 implies a more or less consistent increase in the degree of 
electoral competition through the mid-1970s (dramatically so for the more developed states) 
followed by a slow deterioration in the degree of electoral competition that has continued 
through the to the end of our sample. In addition, it can be seen that throughout the whole 
period, the level of electoral competition by this measure is indicated as being consistently lower 
in BIMAROU states than in more economically advanced states. 
 
This ranking of the two groups is consistent with that implied by the AMS measures in Figure 12 
for the major parties competing at the state level. The elections in the BIMAROU states have a 
consistently lower proportion of marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry available for potential 
capture than their more developed counterparts. Across the 1972–2009 period, the measures 
show no overall trend, although the fall-off in both measures towards the end of our time period 
is consistent with the decline in competition suggested by the rise in ENP in Figure 9. 
 
The competition story told by the two volatility adjusted margins at the constituency level, 
however, is quite different. Figure 10 indicates that the volatility adjusted first versus second place 
margin is always larger in the more affluent states implying that elections are less competitive 
there, and the multi-party MV_Margins_Candidate measures in Figure 11 reinforce that view, 
showing that when the additional challenge to the incumbent coming from third and higher 
placed competitors is accounted for, the BIMAROU constituency elections are still more 
competitive, except for the second half of the 1980s. The simpler volatility adjusted margins in 
Figure 10 suggest no real trend in constituency competitiveness. But once additional competitors 
are incorporated into the measure, as in Figure 11, competitiveness in the constituencies can be 
seen to trend upwards from the late 1980s. 
 
The difference in these findings, between Figures 9 and 12 on the one hand and Figures 10 and 
11 on the other, which mirrors what was found earlier using caste and class divisions across the 
states, does not necessarily require discovery of the superiority of one of the new measures we 
have proposed over another. Rather the differences may mean that political competition is more 
complex than that implied by an analysis that focuses on one metric alone. The contrast between 
Figures 11 and 12, for example, indicates that what is happening to competition at the 
constituency level is not the same as, and may by systematically opposite to competitiveness 
among the major parties at the state level. Also, after 1990 the less developed states are more 
competitive at the constituency level (Fig 11) and less competitive at the state, party level (Fig 
12). The reason for such contrasting patterns is another interesting subject for further research. 
                                                        
30 These correlations are not found in Table A1. Note that if the dramatic effects of the emergency were ignored 
in the ENP and MV_Margins cases, the correlations would likely have been much higher. 
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7.  Summary and concluding remarks   
 
In this paper we have developed measures of electoral competition in a majoritarian system, and 
applied these measures to study competition across fourteen of the larger, more important states 
in India. Our study has been guided by three general approaches to political competition, each of 
which has usually been explored separately rather than as part of a broader, comparative 
approach. The first approach is based on an analogy between competition in political and in 
private economic markets. Here we follow Duverger-Demsetz public good reasoning (Ferris, 
Winer and Grofman 2016) and consider an increase in ENP as indicating less contestability in an 
electoral contest. The proposed alternatives to ENP measuring departures from Duverger’s long 
run equilibrium level of 2, such as Tpartyness are also computed. They paint a similar picture (their 
correlation with ENP_candidate is about -0.8), but differ from ENP in India because they have no 
trend after 1990, unlike ENP which trends generally upwards. The lack of trend in Tpartyness 
seems to depend first on the dominance of Congress, and then on the entrenchment of multi-
partyness, situations that this measure indicates are equivalent, but which intuitively are not. Our 
judgement is that a good measure of contestability remains to be devised, and doing so is a first 
challenge thrown up by our investigations. 
 
Our second approach focuses on competitiveness as ex ante unpredictability of electoral 
outcomes at the constituency level. We argue, following Przeworski and Sprague (1971), that the 
usual first versus second vote share margin is unreliable and should be normalized by a measure 
of the volatility of the electorate. In addition, while use of the first versus second place margin 
relative to volatility may be satisfactory in a two party system like the U. S., it is less satisfactory 
for a multi-party system like India’s in which many state governments are coalitions. As we have 
seen, the multi-party volatility adjusted margin measure evolves in a manner that is quite 
different from the simpler, first versus second place volatility adjusted measure.  
 
The third approach combines electoral uncertainty with the winner-take-all characteristic of the 
electoral system to focus on the advantage held by one of the major contending parties going into 
an election. This index combines a statistical measure of the proportion of constituencies that are 
electorally marginal (or not safe) with a Euclidean measure of their departure from safe seat 
symmetry across major parties at the state level.  
 
We expect that each of the new indexes may be useful in a particular setting. For example, 
competitiveness at the constituency level as measured by the multi-party index 
MV_Margins_Candidate (either the historical or the adaptive versions) captures a different 
dimension of competitiveness than does asymmetry adjusted marginal seats AMS, the latter 
reflecting what is happening to party competition at the state level.31 The patterns of 
competitiveness uncovered by the MV_Margins and AMS indexes shown in Figures 3 and 4, have 
not been computed for the Indian states before and are done so first with respect to the average 
of these indexes over all 14 major states for the time period 1967 or 1972 to 2009, and then for 
averages over states classified by caste and class, and then by level of development.32  
 
Both indexes suggest that there are at least three important periods of competitiveness: an initial  
                                                        
31 The simple correlation between the historical versions of MV_Margins_candidate and AMS over the 1971–
2009 period is -0.01. ENP_candidate is only moderately correlated with historical MV_Margins_candidate over 
the same period (0.55) and not well correlated with AMS (-0.22). See Table A1a. 
32 The time period for the AMS index is shorter because of the use of three previous elections to define the 
distribution that is used to classify constituencies as safe or marginal. 
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period of declining competition up to about 1980 or, in the case of AMS, up to the late 1980s; 
followed by a decade of instability; and then finally by a period of relative stability (without any 
obvious trend) until 2009. The effect of the emergency – an increase in political competitiveness 
– is immediately apparent in the MV-Margins, and then after a few years in AMS also. The volatile 
intermediate period at the constituency level (seen in MV_Margins) involves rising and then 
declining competitiveness, with the opposite pattern occurring with respect to party competition 
at the state level (AMS). It remains to be determined if the opposition of these patterns is causal, 
and if so, why.   
 
When the states are combined into four caste and class based groups, we see different patterns 
and orderings across the four groups with respect to the MV_Margins and AMS indexes. However, 
when each index is considered by itself, the four group specific measures are found to be 
cointegrated. Providing an explanation for these common trends is another challenge raised by 
our study. Similarly, the classification of states by level of development is also revealing. With the 
exception of the 1985-90 period, the five, low income BIMAROU states tend to be more highly 
competitive than the nine higher income states at the constituency level, as measured by 
MV_Margins, especially after the mid-1990s. At the state level, however, the AMS index indicates 
that the BIMAROU states are consistently less competitive. Evidently there is a different pattern 
to electoral competitiveness among the individual candidates at the constituency level than there 
is among parties at the state level. Explaining this stylized fact is an additional challenge 
uncovered by our analysis.  
 
How to combine the different dimensions of competition that we have measured and explored 
into an overall assessment of competitiveness, if it is desirable to do so, is perhaps the biggest of 
the unsolved conceptual and quantitative problems. Further work on all of these questions is 
needed to open the door to a more general analysis, one that can incorporate the different forms 
of electoral competition studied in the paper and at the same time place electoral competition 
within the broader context of political competition. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Correlations for Periods Corresponding to the Figures in the Text 
 
ENP  
candidate 
ENP Party  
(votes) 
ENP Party  
(seats) Closeness T-partyness D2 
Win_ 
Margin Volatility 
Vol_adj 
_margin 
MV_Margins 
_Party_Hist 
MV_Margins 
_Party_Adapt 
MV_Margins_ 
Candidate_Hist 
MV_Margins_ 
Candidate_ Adapt MS AMS 
Correlations: 1952 – 2009 
ENP candidate 1.00               
ENP Party (votes) 0.11 1.00              
ENP Party (seats) -0.35 0.79 1.00             
Closeness -0.78 0.3 0.61 1.00            
T-partyness -0.79 0.32 0.59 0.94 1.00           
D2 -0.8 0.33 0.63 0.98 0.98 1.00          
Win_Margin -0.84 0.22 0.53 0.94 0.99 0.97 1.00         
Correlations: 1962 – 2009 
Volatility -0.45 -0.71 -0.68 0.15 -0.22 -0.1 -0.04 1.00        
Vol_adj_margin -0.2 -0.08 0.06 0.09 0.3 0.17 0.29 -0.57 1.00       
Correlations: 1967 – 2009 
MV_Margins_Party_Hist 0.57 0.5 0.45 0.14 0.09 0.07 -0.08 -0.7 0.58 1.00      
MV_Margins_Party_Adapt 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.18 0.07 0.07 -0.11 -0.64 0.48 0.99 1.00     
MV_Margins_Candidate_Hist 0.61 0.63 0.53 0.19 0.18 0.17 -0.03 -0.69 0.43 0.94 0.95 1.00    
MV_Margins_Candidate_ Adapt 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.13 0.08 0.1 -0.14 -0.63 0.25 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.00   
Correlations: 1971 – 2009 
MS -0.15 0.06 0.17 0.46 0.44 0.55 0.43 0.12 -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.04 1.00  
AMS -0.22 -0.12 0.02 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.38 0.27 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.95 1.00 
Note: Different measures of competitiveness are available for different periods. Correlations in Table A1 are reported in the text. 
 
Table A1a: Correlations for All Variables, 1971 - 2009 
 
ENP  
candidate 
ENP Party  
(votes) 
ENP Party  
(seats) Closeness T-partyness D2 
Win_ 
Margin Volatility 
Vol_adj 
_margin 
MV_Margins 
_Party_Hist 
MV_Margins 
_Party_Adapt 
MV_Margins_ 
Candidate_Hist 
MV_Margins_ 
Candidate_ Adapt MS AMS 
ENP candidate 1.00               
ENP Party (votes) 0.76 1.00              
ENP Party (seats) 0.75 0.94 1.00             
Closeness -0.55 -0.05 0.02 1.00            
T-partyness -0.37 0.18 0.08 0.76 1.00           
D2 -0.39 0.15 0.11 0.84 0.97 1.00          
Win_Margin -0.57 -0.07 -0.14 0.77 0.95 0.93 1.00         
Volatility -0.63 -0.77 -0.73 0.06 -0.26 -0.16 -0.06 1.00        
Vol_adj_margin -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.29 0.37 0.27 0.34 -0.53 1.00       
MV_Margins_Party_Hist 0.55 0.52 0.63 0.11 0.09 0.07 -0.08 -0.78 0.66 1.00      
MV_Margins_Party_Adapt 0.57 0.54 0.67 0.14 0.06 0.07 -0.11 -0.73 0.57 0.99 1.00     
MV_Margins_Candidate_Hist 0.61 0.66 0.72 0.16 0.18 0.17 -0.02 -0.76 0.5 0.93 0.95 1.00    
MV_Margins_Candidate_ Adapt 0.71 0.74 0.8 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.13 -0.71 0.31 0.87 0.91 0.97 1.00   
MS -0.15 0.06 0.17 0.46 0.44 0.55 0.43 0.12 -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.04 1.00  
AMS -0.22 -0.12 0.02 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.38 0.27 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.95 1.00 
Note: This table reports correlation coefficients of all the measures for the same period, 1971 – 2009, as well as for subperiods corresponding the figures in the text. The definitions of the indexes are given in the text. Indexes 
are defined at either the constituency level and aggregated up to the state level, or initially at the state level, and in all cases then averaged across the states. Closeness is defined in Appendix A3. Some abbreviations are used 
here to save space. ENP (votes) (or seats) refers to ENP at the state level defined by vote shares (or seat shares) in the legislature, averaged across states.  'Win-Margin' refers to the first versus second place vote share margin. 
'Vol_adj_margin' is the volatility adjusted Win_Margin.  The suffix '_Hist' refers to the historical version of the multi-party index, and '_Adapt' to the adaptive version.
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A2.  Linking constituencies through administrative districts to deal with redistricting 
 
For almost all measures of electoral competitiveness we develop two alternative metrics: 
historical and adaptive measures. Historical measures use the electoral outcomes of the previous 
election, whereas adaptive measures link together current and previous outcomes. Because our 
measures are based on constituencies, both measures become problematic when the 
constituency is redistricted. A new constituency has no past, and a past is required to measure 
volatility and to define historical and ex ante measures.    
 
In India the constitutionally appointed body given responsibility for redistricting constituencies is 
the Delimitation Commission.  As of the present, Delimitation Commissions have met in the years: 
1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002 with recommendations implemented in the years: 1957, 1967, 1974 
and 2008.  Constitutionally a new commission was to be established every 10 years; however, in 
1976 the federal government postponed implementation of the 1974 recommendations until 
after the 2001 census so that the family planning programs of the federal government would not 
be affected by a change in political representation at the constituency level. Further, the 
constitution of India was amended in 2002 and this led to the postponement of the next 
delimitation of constituencies till the first census following 2026. It follows that the next round of 
constituency redistricting will not take place until after 2031 population census.  Taken together 
this means that no redistricting arose at the constituency level between the years 1974 and 2008.  
 
While construction of competitive measures using current data alone is unaffected by the issue 
of constituency redistricting, the development of constituency measures that use both current 
and historical data across elections requires a method of linking current constituencies with the 
past for the elections before 1974. In this paper we use administrative districts to overcome this 
problem. 
 
All Indian states are divided into administrative districts whose size is typically much larger than 
an electoral constituency. On average, an administrative district consists of 5 to 7 constituencies. 
The Delimitation Commission reports provide details on which constituencies were redistricted 
and which were not and are available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/delimitation_pub_rpt.aspx. From these 
reports we constructed a district-constituency code linking each electoral constituency with their 
administrative district. For constituencies that were not redistricted, the linking of their current 
and past historical data is quite straightforward. For constituencies that were redistricted, 
however, the district-constituency code was used to construct a past history based on the average 
of that district’s non-redistricted constituencies electoral outcomes. That is, in lieu of a 
constituency past we use the past of a representative constituency from the same district. 
 
Because no redistricting was done in years between 1974 and 2008, the list of districts existing 
between 1974 and 2008 were used to establish the district-constituency linking code.  The code 
was then used both backwards from 1974 to generate a set of electoral outcomes for 1974 and 
earlier redistricted constituencies and forward for those elections following 2008. Because there 
was only a marginal increase in the number of constituencies in the elections between 1962 and 
1967, and the number of constituencies in each state has remained constant since, we could use 
the coding to construct historical measures of our competitive measures all the way back to the 
state assembly elections held in 1962 without difficulty. However, for elections held before 1962, 
complications arose because a number of constituencies elected two members and considerable 
variation arose in both the names and numbers of constituencies. Given these difficulties, our 
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method for addressing the information loss associated with constituency redistricting here is 
likely to be somewhat less useful. 
 
 
A3. Closeness as an alternative to ENP, Tpartyness and D2  
 
We noted in the text that a problem with ENP defined by vote shares as a basis for a test of 
Duverger's Law is that while it is equal to 2 with two equal parties, a value of 2 can also originate 
with shares such as (0.666, 0.167, 0.167) where one party is dominant, while a rise in ENP above 
2 from such situations can represent a state with a more equal division of votes between two 
major parties, as with shares (0.40, 0.40, 0.20) for which ENP = 2.78.  
 
Duverger's Law aside, from a competitiveness point of view the latter situation appears to be 
more competitive in terms of the distribution of vote shares. Moreover, if one is concerned with 
competitveness rather than with departures of the number of parties from 2, one can also see 
that ENP mistakenly treats outcomes like (0.5, 0.5; ENP =2) as inherently different than (0.33, 
0.33, 0.33; ENP = 3), whereas both can be said to be examples of 'close' or, in this sense, highly 
competitive elections. 
 
In response to examples like these, Endersby et al (2002) use the distribution of vote shares to 
derive a measure of the Closeness of an election that treats examples like those above more 
appropriately, asuming of course that the objective is to construct an index of competitiveness as 
closeness. Their index of the Closeness of an election, CL, is defined as  
  
 	"#$% = 	'( ∗ ∏ +,%(,-.   ,                                                  (A3) 
 
where K is equal to the integer value of /01$%  in each state. 	"#$% = 0	if there is an uncontested 
election (v1 = 1) and "#$% = 1 if all K candidates have equal vote shares.  
 
This index for the 14 Indian states is graphed in Figure A1 along with ENP, T-partyness and D2. As 
can be seen from the figure, the average state Closeness index mirrors the D2 Euclidean measure, 
while differing mostly just in scale from T-partyness, a fact that is not obvious from contemplation 
of the formulas alone. The correlations of Closeness, T-partyness and D2 are given in Table A1. 
ENP_candidate is negatively correlated with all of these measures at about - 0.8 and differs from 
the other by exhibiting a positive trend after the mid 1980s.  
 
[Figure A1 here] 
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Figure A1: Closeness, ENP_candidate, T-partyness and D2, 1952-2009 
 
 
 
A4. Grouping of states by caste and class  
 
As noted in the text, the classification of states by caste and class is based on Church (1984) who 
develops a fourfold caste and class hierarchy to study caste and class centric politics in 7 major 
Indian states (Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal), 
extended by Harriss (1999) to include 6 more major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu). We use the classification in Harriss (1999, 
Table 2, 3371), dividing our set of 14 Indian states into four broad groupings, described in some 
detail here.  
 
Group 1 consists of states where caste forms the organizational basis for political parties (Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh). Bihar and Uttar Pradesh constitute the core of the ‘Hindi heartland’ and hold 
more than one fourth of India’s population. Until the late 1970s, the Congress Party of India ruled 
both these states largely unopposed. In the early 1980s, the Mandal Commission, set up to 
consider the reservation of government jobs and places in public universities for Other Backward 
Classes’ (OBCs), Scheduled Castes (SCs) and other ‘middle’ caste/classes, had a widespread socio-
economic impact in India and disproportionately so for the politics of the North Indian states of 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.33 While the struggle for political accommodation of OBCs and SCs 
continued through the elections of the 1980s, the inability of mainstream parties to accommodate 
middle and lower castes led to the formation of caste-based regional political parties. In Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh these parties multiplied, with some achieving electoral success. For example, the 
Samajwadi Party (SP) formed the government in Uttar Pradesh in 1992 while Rashtriya Janata Dal 
(RJD) formed the government in Bihar in 1997. The emergence of caste-based politics has 
increased the number of actively competing parties and introduced political instability with 
elections now contested by parties representing different castes. Because of this fragmentation, 
                                                        
33 Yadav and Palshikar (2003) discuss the impact of the Mandal Commission on Indian politics in greater detail.  
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parties struggle to find the required plurality to govern and often must form coalitions in order to 
form a government. The difficulty of maintaining coalitions has led several governments to fall  
prematurely. 
 
Group 2 includes states in which class and regional concerns form the basis for party structure 
(Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal). Unlike in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, caste based 
representation has always been fairly uniform among the political parties contesting elections in 
the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Here political divisions are based on class 
concerns and regional interests. In Kerala and West Bengal, the Communist Party of India has 
enjoyed considerable success by implementing land reforms that have benefited voters in the 
middle and lower classes. In Tamil Nadu, as early as the 1960s political leaders mobilized voters 
by targeting an ethnic desire to preserve regional language and culture. Success led to the 
Congress Party losing control in Tamil Nadu by 1967, and since that time the state has been 
governed by two similar regional parties, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Also facilitating party formation on regional rather than 
caste lines is the fact that the population share of upper castes in Tamil Nadu is small in 
comparison with other Indian states. This has restricted the ability of the upper castes to gain or 
maintain political dominance. 
 
Group 3 is comprised of states where the middle castes or classes and commercial interests 
dominate party structure (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and 
Punjab). In the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Punjab 
the middle castes and classes dominate the state numerically and politically. As with most of the 
other states, the upper castes dominated politics from Independence through the 1950s and 
1960s. However, by virtue of their larger population size and stronger economic presence at the 
local level, the middle castes in these six states slowly replaced the upper castes through the  
1970s and 1980s. 
 
Middle castes have dominated politics in these states for various, state-specific reasons. In only a 
few pockets of these states do the lower castes have significant political representation. For 
example, in parts of Maharashtra splinter groups of the Republican Party of India (RPI) have 
formed an effective alliance with the scheduled castes. But such cases remain the exception with 
the core of political power held by the middle caste/classes. Even in Andhra Pradesh where lower 
and scheduled castes make up about 50 percent of the population, their uneven distribution 
across the state leaves them too fragmented in small sub-caste groups to stand united. Hence 
even though reddys and kammas constitute only about 20 percent of Andhra Pradesh’s 
population, they have continued to dominate political power by successfully accommodating 
lower caste interests. The state is now governed by two parties, the Congress Party and a regional 
party, Telugu Desam Party (TDP). The vokkaligas and lingayats make up about 30 percent of 
Karnataka’s population. As in Andhra Pradesh, these two dominant castes have retained power 
by catering to the interests of lower castes when necessary.  
 
In Gujarat economic and financial power is held by brahmans, banias, and patidars, whereas 
rajputs and koli kshatriyas hold political power. Though the caste structure has been weakening 
in Gujarat, the lower castes haves not gained political power (Shah 1990). As with most states, 
the Congress Party governed Gujarat until the mid-1990s without substantial opposition until the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged in 1990s, and as a result, Congress has been out of power 
since 1998.  
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The marathas alone constitute about 30 percent of Maharashtra’s population. However, it’s not  
just numbers that favour the marathas; they control land and trade at the local level. Even though  
Maharashtra is one of the few states where schedules castes are well mobilized and form a 
sizeable share of the state’s population, their lack of participation in land onership and trade has 
likely prevented them from challenging the marathas politically. The Congress Party ruled the 
state on its own until 1995, and has been in a coalition with Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) since 
1999.  
 
The caste typology used above is applicable to the Hindu religion. Punjab, on the other hand, is a 
state where more than two-thirds of the population are Sikhs. Though the sub-castes of Punjab 
are very different from that of other states, they can be arranged under the four caste/class 
classification we have adopted. The Sikh jats are successful landowners who constitute more than 
20 percent of Punjab’s population. This has allowed the them to control both the economy and 
politics in Punjab despite the fact that Sikh artisans and Sikh Scheduled castes make up more than 
one third of Punjab’s population. Unlike most other states, following independence the Congress 
Party faced the Akali Dal, a strong Sikh-based regional party. These two parties have ruled Punjab 
since independence.  
 
Haryana was carved out of Punjab in 1966 and retains retains most of the features of Punjab. It is 
a predominantly agrarian state. Here the jats constitute about 30 percent of Haryana’s 
population, and as in Punjab have been both economically and politically powerful since the state 
was formed. 
 
Group 4 consists of states where upper caste or class dominance persists (Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha, and Rajasthan). While the princely states of Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Rajasthan 
formally disappeared with Indian independence in 1947, the princes retained power for some 
time with political leadership provided by the upper castes. In more recent years some progress 
has been made increasing middle caste and class representation, but the lower castes in these 
states are still relatively powerless. Sizable parts of the population in these states, known 
collectively as Scheduled Tribes (STs), live apart from mainstream society in their tribal areas. The 
STs usually do not demand political accommodation, and this has helped the upper castes to 
maintain political dominance. In all three states the Congress Party ruled single-handedly until 
1989-90, with occasional challenges from the opposition. Since then it has faced more extensive 
competition from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, and from 
Janata Dal (JD) and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) parties later on in Odisha. Overall, the state party 
systems in this group have been stable, revolving around two major parties for most electoral 
periods. 
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A5.  Volatility by social grouping and by income 
 
Figures A2 and A3 present vote volatility as defined in the main text, for states classified by 
social grouping and by level of real per capita income in 2008/09. The grouping by caste was 
discussed in section A4. Concerning the grouping by income, it may be noted that the ratio of 
real income per capita in the highest income state to that with the lowest income in 2008/09 is 
about 5 to 1. Also, on average, real income per capita grows by almost three times over the 
period from 1952.  
 
[Figures A2 and A3 here] 
 
In both figures, a peak at the time of the emergency in 1977 is apparent, as are the smaller peaks,  
in the late 1980s when the Congress party began to lose its predominance and during the balance 
of payments crisis in the early 1990s, and in the early 2000s when multiparty coalitions became 
more numerous following a severe economic recession. On the whole however, there are two 
periods - first a period of rising volatility up to the emergency, and then a period of generally 
declining volatility. This is more or less the same pattern that emerges when using an aggregate 
volatility index defined over all states without grouping, as shown in Figure 2 of the main text.  
 
As for the indexes by social grouping and income discussed in the main text, we see here that  
indexes of volatility also appear to exhibit common trends. Thus again, as for the indexes of 
competitiveness in Figures 5 - 8, it seems that there is something more fundamental underlying 
the patterns observed that remains to be identified. 
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Figure A2: Volatility by Social Groupings, 1962-2009 
 
Notes:  
Group 1: states where caste forms the  basis for political parties (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh);  
Group 2: states where class and regional concerns form the basis for party structure (Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu and West Bengal;   
Group 3: states where the middle castes  and commercial interests dominate party structure (Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Punjab;   
Group 4: states where upper caste/class dominance persists (Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and 
Rajasthan). 
 
 
Figure A3: Volatility by Economic Grouping, 1962-2009 
 
Notes: 
BIMAROU (sick)  states: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh 
Others: All other states are included in the second group of more developed states.  
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